AI Agents Hunt Exposed AI Apps to Steal Keys: What to Check
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On 13 November 2026, Amazon reported campaigns in which attacker-run AI agents scan the internet for exposed AI applications, such as LiteLLM, Dify, Open WebUI and Ollama, to pull out the model-provider keys stored inside. If your business self-hosts one of these tools on a server, this applies to you.
What we know
- Who reported it: Amazon's threat intelligence team, on the AWS Security Blog, on 13 November 2026. It caught the activity with MadPot, a network of decoy servers posing as AI model APIs, between 3 October and 5 November 2026.
- What the agents did: according to Amazon, they found AI apps and gateways open to the internet, extracted the provider keys stored in them, checked that the keys worked and added them to a shared pool. They favored apps that hold keys for several providers.
- Which software they targeted: Amazon names One API, New API, Veloera, Sub2API, LiteLLM, Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, Open WebUI, LobeChat and Ollama.
- How they got in: default credentials (Amazon cites LiteLLM's default master key), unfinished installs anyone could claim, authentication bypasses, server-side request forgery against cloud metadata services, and secrets left in client-side JavaScript, source maps, debug routes and environment files. Also known flaws in Langflow (CVE-2025-3248) and RAGFlow (CVE-2026-28797).
- Where they looked for keys: per Amazon, internet scanners, certificate transparency logs, GitHub repositories, npm and PyPI packages, container image layers, paste sites and Telegram channels.
- When they found cloud credentials, the agents went after that account's managed AI model services, again according to Amazon.
- Who is behind it: Amazon has moderate confidence that the agents ran on ARTEX, which it describes as an open-source agentic AI penetration testing framework, and that the operators were separate China-linked groups.
- Scale: the agents' records covered "hundreds of targets," Amazon says. It notified AWS customers who may have been affected and published 11 IP addresses as indicators.
- What Amazon can't confirm: it says it could not verify the outcomes the agents reported, since it did not observe that activity as it happened.
- A second campaign: Amazon also logged agents trying to beat selfie-based identity checks with real-time deepfake video; the verification vendor rejected it in every recorded attempt.
What changes and what doesn't
- No new technique. "None of the techniques in these campaigns were new," Amazon says. What is new is scale: an agent probes hundreds of servers without a break and finds in hours what used to take weeks.
- A small slip costs more. A stolen AI key is cash for the attacker and a bill for the owner. One poorly locked gateway can expose keys for several providers at once.
- Not affected: people who use ChatGPT, Gemini or Claude through the official website or app, and ordinary WordPress or Drupal sites with no AI tools installed on their server.
- Affected: anyone who installed, or had someone install, one of these apps on a VPS, a cloud server or an office machine reachable from the internet, even "just for testing."
How to tell if this affects you
- Make a list. Write down which AI apps run on servers you control: the chatbot on your site, a model gateway such as LiteLLM, a Dify or Open WebUI for your team, a test Ollama. Test setups and anything a vendor set up for you count too.
- Check what the outside world sees. Open each app's address from your phone on mobile data, off the office network. If you get a login screen, it is exposed; if you get the dashboard with no login, shut it now. The safer setup is behind a VPN, an IP allowlist or a proper login.
- Change the defaults. Admin passwords and, in LiteLLM, the master key. If an install was left half-finished, finish it or turn it off: an unfinished installer can be claimed by anyone.
- Hunt for stray keys. Make sure no AI key shows up in code your visitors' browsers download (in the browser, "View source" and search for "sk-" or "key"), in .env files reachable from the web, in public repositories or in published container images. If your site has a chatbot, the key belongs on the server, never in the JavaScript.
- Update. Langflow and RAGFlow appear in the report with specific flaws: keep them on their latest release and turn off open user sign-up if you don't need it.
- Set caps and watch usage. With each model provider (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google and so on), turn on a spending limit and alerts, and review the last few days of usage. A spike your traffic doesn't explain is the fastest signal.
- If something was exposed, treat its keys as stolen: create new keys, swap them into your apps and revoke the old ones. Do the same with any cloud credentials on that server.
Related: LLMjacking: Stolen AI Keys Run Up Cloud Bills
Sources
- Amazon Web Services Security Blog, "Amazon threat intelligence observes threat actors running cybercrime campaigns with ARTEX AI agents," 13 November 2026
- RAGFlow security advisory GHSA-vvwj-fvwh-4whx (CVE-2026-28797)
- Langflow 1.3.0 release
- The Hacker News, "Amazon Uncovers AI Agent Campaign Targeting LiteLLM, Dify, and Other Apps for API Keys," 16 November 2026
Updates: any changes backed by a primary source will be added here.